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It is a natural psychological response to the atmosphere pro-
duced by recently publicized accounts of both high and low level
abuses of law enforcement powers for a person accused of a felony
to feel that he is now, more than ever, in a position akin to a
modern David facing the Goliath of the criminal justice system-
a stroke of luck is the only hope. From the opposing camp the cry
of those outraged by ever-increasing crime rates demands swift
punishment of criminals and additional controls imposed upon
personal freedom. It is not surprising, therefore, that these two
groups-those who desire more protection for the accused from the
unfettered discretion of the state on the one hand, and those who
demand greater state power to control and punish the criminal on
the other-are too often pitted against each other, failing to recog-
nize their common goal - an efficient, equitable, and practical
system of criminal justice which punishes the guilty without depriv-
ing the innocent of their personal liberty. The preliminary exami-
nation is a procedural safeguard which, if fairly considered and
properly conducted, could serve in a crucial capacity to answer the
demands of both interest groups.
Recent developments in the field of criminal justice have em-
phasized the importance of procedural safeguards in the pre-trial
stages of criminal prosecutions.' The particular importance of the
modern2 preliminary examination as a critical safeguard has been
emphasized continuously.3 Nevertheless, in practice its import-
1. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
2. For a good historical perspective of the development of the preliminary hearing see
I HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3rd ed. 1922); 2 POLLACK AND MAITLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1st ed. 1895); ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM
ARREST TO APPEAL 53-58 (1947). Note, The Preliminary Hearing - An Interest Analysis,
51 IOWA L. REV. 374 (1967); Brower, Pre-Trial Procedures in Criminal Cases: A Compara-
tive View, 2 PORTIA L. J. 2 (1966) (this article presents an excellent analysis of the difference
in inquisatorial and accusatorial procedures).
3. MOBLEY, OUR CRIMINAL COURTS 26 (1930):
While preliminary hearing is ordinarily neglected and despised by commentators, it
is in every respect the most important link in the process of administering justice. It
might well be concluded with a good deal of justification that so far as effective
enforcement of criminal law is concerned the preliminary hearing is more important
than the trial itself.
Graham and Letwin, The Preliminary Hearing in Los Angeles: Some Field Findings and
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ance is too often overlooked.' Until recently, there have been few
attempts at identifying and analyzing the nature of the preliminary
examination or its possible functional considerations. As a result,
the procedure stagnates as a mechanical routine rather than a point
of pivotal concern in a criminal prosecution. Several recent devel-
opments in this area require attention and analysis.
A recent Claifornia decision, People v. Uhlemann,5 represents
a progressive attempt at development of the preliminary examina-
tion as a more meaningful procedural device by the California
court. The thesis of this discussion is that, while not professing this
case represents the ultimate solution, People v. Uhlemann is a sign
of future reconsideration and development in the preliminary hear-
ing; one which should not go unheeded. The purpose of this discus-
sion is to reappraise Wisconsin's present preliminary examination
procedure in light of the Uhlemann decision, emphasizing its pro-
cedural implications, the conflicts it presents to present Wisconsin
procedure, and proposing possible changes which could give this
procedure a new usefulness and vitality in the Wisconsin criminal
process.
PEOPLE V. UHLEMANN EXAMINED
The court in People v. Uhlemann held:
. * [N]otwithstanding the rule that a magistrate's dismissal of
criminal charges following a preliminary examination does not
bar the prosecution from either refiling the same charges before
another magistrate, or seeking an indictment based upon those
charges, an exception exists where the magistrate's findings of
Legal Policy Observations, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 635, 641 (1970-71):
The preliminary hearing has great potential as a check on the exercise of prosecu-
torial discretion and is an important procedural mechanism within the criminal
process.
See also Washington v. Clemmer, 33 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Blue v. U.S., 342 F.2d
894 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1
(1970).
4. Anderson, The Preliminary Hearing - Better Alternatives or More of the Same?, 35
Mo. L. REV. 281 (1970), citing the remarks of Warren Olney III, Director, Administration
Office of U.S. Courts stating that the preliminary hearing was a "waste of time and effort"
in his testimony during Hearings on U.S. Commissioner System before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
Ist Sess. pt. 2, at 126-28 (1965); See also Graham and Letwin, supra note 3 at 636 citing
People v. Gibbs, 255 Cal. App. 2d 739, 743, 63 Cal. Rptr. 471, 475 (3rd Dist. 1967):
In most California criminal prosecutions the preliminary examination is conducted
as a rather perfunctory uncontested proceeding with only one likely denoument - an
order holding the defendant for trial.
5. 8 Cal. 3d 348, 105 Cal. Rptr. 21, 503 P.2d 277 (1972).
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fact affirmatively establish defendant's innocence, or disclose an
absolute defense to the crime charged; absent unusual circum-
stances, the People should in that situation be barred from initi-
ating further proceedings based upon the charges so dismissed.'
In response to the above statement, Wisconsin would agree that
a dismissal of the criminal charges at the preliminary hearing stage
does not bar a refiling of those charges by the prosecution,7 but as
yet Wisconsin has not ventured so far as to allow the exception
granted by this California court.
In reaching this decision the California court formulated sev-
eral principles which in themselves represent progressive exten-
sions in criminal pre-trial procedure. A closer examination of the
court's reasoning will serve as an explanation of how these exten-
sions were formulated and how they serve as the foundation for the
ultimate ruling. A comparison of Wisconsin judicial thought con-
cerning these same concepts will show several conflicts, explaining
perhaps why Wisconsin has not yet gone as far as the Uhlemann
ruling.
The California court's major premise centers on the basic pur-
pose of the preliminary hearing: to weed out groundless charges.'
If the district attorney is permitted to totally ignore the factual
findings of the magistrate by refiling the same charges, the purpose
of the preliminary hearing is completely frustrated. The court,
recognizing this fact, stated:
Instead it seems evident to us that the magistrate's findings must
be clothed with enough finality to insure the accused a meaning-
ful preliminary examination and to protect him from needless
harassment.'
Supporting this premise as conditions precedent to its validity are
two minor premises.
The first supporting premise concerns the role of the magis-
trate. Ordinarily a magistrate does not make any formal factual
findings, but merely determines if there was a crime committed
and if there exists probable cause to believe the defendant commit-
6. People v. Uhlemann, 8 Cal. 3d 348, 105 Cal. Rptr. 21, 503 P.2d 277 (1972) (herein-
after cited as Uhlemann).
7. Wis. STAT. § 970.04 (1971); State ex rel. Beck v. Duffy, 38 Wis. 2d 159, 156 N.W.2d
368 (1968); State ex rel. Klinkiewicz v. Duffy, 35 Wis. 2d 369, 151 N.W.2d 63 (1967); State
v. Fish, 20 Wis. 2d 431, 122 N.W.2d 381 (1963).
8. Uhlemann at 283, 8 Cal. 3d ____ 105 Cal. Rptr. at 27, accord Thies v. State, 178
Wis. 98, 103, 189 N.W. 539, 541 (1922).
9. Uhlemann at 283, 8 Cal. 3d _ 105 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
19741
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ted it.1o Therefore the magistrate would have no occasion to form
any definite conclusion on the accused's guilt or innocence. Never-
theless, in light of prior California case law" the magistrate is
endowed with the power to weigh the evidence, to resolve conflicts,
and to give or withhold credence to particular witnesses; and in
appropriate cases he should wield this power to preclude further
prosecution. 2 Applying this'premise to the facts, the magistrate in
Uhlemann, when hearing the testimony of the State's witness,
found her testimony to be patently incredible and made a factual
determination that the defendant was innocent by reason of entrap-
ment. 3 The court emphasized that this was a factual determina-
tion based on the magistrate's power to make such a finding, and
for this reason was distinguishable from other types of determina-
tions by a magistrate which might dismiss the charge but would
not operate on the merits. Based on this distinction, the finding of
the magistrate was accorded proper finality."
The second supporting premise concerns the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. The doctrine of res judicata is
normally a bar to further action only after the defendant has been
placed in jeopardy. Because the preliminary hearing has never been
ruled a hearing in which the requisite amount of jeopardy is pres-
ent, res judicata does not apply.' 5 Yet, the court reasoned that since
this procedure was a full adversary hearing, and since under certain
circumstances (here relying on their prior extension of the magis-
trate's power to make a factual determination as to the accused's
guilt or innocence requiring finality) it can result in a dismissal on
the merits, res judicata and collateral estoppal should apply.',
In addition, the court employed another concept to support its
ruling. Relying on a particular California statute which granted the
state the right to appeal an order dismissing an action at the pre-
liminary examination stage, before jeopardy attaches, 7 the court
pointed out that the prosecution was not left without recourse for
judicial review of the magistrate's determination; albeit this proce-
10. Id. at 281,8 Cal. 3d -, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 25; CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 871, 872 (1972).
11. Jones v. Superior Ct., 4 Cal. 3d 660, 94 Cal. Rptr. 289,483 P.2d 1241 (1971); People
v. Massengale, 261 Cal. 2d. 758, 68 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1968); Rideout v. Superior Ct. of Santa
Clara County, 67 Cal.2d 471, 62 Cal. Rptr. 581, 432 P.2d 197 (1967).
12. Uhlemann at 282, 8 Cal. 3d __, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
13. Id. at 279, 8 Cal. 3d -, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
14. Id. at 280, 8 Cal. 3d. , 105 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
15. Id. at 281, 8 Cal. 3d __, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
16. Id.
17. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1446(1)(a) (1972).
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dure of review was more burdensome than merely refiling the
charges.18
As remarkable as some of these extensions appear at first
glance, they are not without foundation. Commentators on the
subject have proposed such extensions to improve the preliminary
hearing:
[ . . T]he judicial role in pre-trial screening involves weighing
and judgment rather than a wooden comparison of the testimony
with the elements of the crime. Although credibility ordinarily is
a matter for the jury, and it is not expected that judges will
normally resolve testimonial conflicts at the preliminary hearing,
cases do occasionally arise at which a witness's testimony is so
weak or contradicted by sufficiently clear facts that the judge
should have the power to dismiss the case."
Magistrates should be required to make more explicit the
basis of their decision to facilitate understanding and review.
The prosecutor should be provided a remedy of appeal from
decisions of the magistrate. The prosecutor's power to refile
charges that have been dismissed and add charges not approved
by the magistrate ought to be curtailed."0
By this decision, the California court has implemented these pro-
posals in a commitment to increase the usefulness of the prelimi-
nary examination procedure.
WISCONSIN'S ANSWER
Present Wisconsin law prescribes that the accused shall be
taken before a judge for an initial appearance within a reasonable
time after arrest.2 ' At the initial appearance, the accused is fur-
nished a copy of the complaint. The judge then informs him of the
charge against him, his right to counsel, and, in the event he is
found to be indigent, his right to have counsel appointed, and his
right to a preliminary hearing if he is charged with a felony. The
judge will then admit the accused to bdil in accordance with chap-
ter 969.12
Recent changes in the applicable Wisconsin Statutes provide
that the accused charged with a felony be also informed of the
18. Uhlemann at 284, n. 7, 8 Cal. 3d , 105 Cal. Rptr. at 28, n. 7.
19. MODEL PENAL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, § 330.5(3) p. 91 (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1972).
20. Graham and Letwin supra note 3 at 642.
21. Wis. STAT. § 970.01(1) (1971).
22. Wis. STAT. § 970.02 (1971).
1974]
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penalties assigned the particular offense with which he is charged,
and the right to a preliminary examination is now afforded to those
charged with a felony by indictment or those returned to the state
for prosecution through extradition proceedings under chapter
976.2 The change granting a preliminary examination following
an indictment overrules the cases of State ex rel. Welch v. Wauke-
sha Cy. Circuit Br. 11 and-Johns v. State, 2 and effectively pre-
cludes the state from avoiding the preliminary examination by
going to the grand jury for an indictment as is the practice in the
federal courts?25 In addition, the accused may now only waive his
right to a preliminary hearing "in writing or in open court. ' 2
Barring any such waiver the judge will transfer the action to a
county court for the preliminary hearingY
The Wisconsin Supreme Court would agree with the California
court that the primary purpose of the preliminary hearing is to
weed out unsupportable charges and protect the person charged
from oppressive prosecution.18 But, as previously stated, the court
has not clothed this procedure with finality under any circumstan-
ces as the California court has done. The reasons for the failure of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court to so rule lie partially in the views
it has held concerning those very principles which provided the
supportive bases for the California court's conclusion. In a number
of areas the views of the Wisconsin court conflict with those of the
California court.
When faced with the task of attempting to define what the role
of the magistrate is in the preliminary hearing, the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court has confused the issue, using conflicting language. In
State v. Knudson,2 9 the court spent considerable time justifying the
23. Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 45 §§ 970.02 and 971.02.
24. 52 Wis. 2d 221, 189 N.W.2d 417 (1970); 14 Wis. 2d 119, 109 N.W. 2d 490 (1961).
25. Hearings on S. 3474, S. 945 before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Judic. Comm., 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at
34, 59, 99-100, 240-41, 477 (1967); Comment, The Preliminary Examination in the Federal
System: A Proposal for a Rule Change, 116 U. PENN. L. REV. 1416 (1968); 1968 Fed.
Magistrate's Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3060(e); Note: Ross v. Sirica, 380 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
Holmes v. U.S., 370 F.2d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Blue v. U.S., 342 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965).
26. Wis. Laws. 1973, ch. 45 § 971.02.
27. Wis. STAT. § 970.02(5) (1971).
28. Thies v. State, 178 Wis. 98, 193, 187 N.W. 539, 541 (1922); accord State ex rel.
Welch v. Waukesha Cy. Cir. Ct. Br. II, 52 Wis. 2d 221, 189 N.W.2d 417 (1971); State ex
rel. Klinkiewicz v. Duffy, 35 Wis. 2d 369, 373, 151 N.W.2d 63, 66 (1967); Whitty v. State,
34 Wis. 2d 278, 149 N.W.2d 577 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 959 (1968).
29. 51 Wis.2d 270, 187 N.W.2d 321 (1971).
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reliability of an informant by applying the two-pronged test estab-
lished in Aguilar v. Texas,3" which provided that when a complaint
is based on hearsay information, the officer must establish:
(1) the underlying circumstances from which he concludes that
the informant is reliable; and (2) that the underlying circumstan-
ces or manner in which the informant obtained his information
is reliable. 3'
In using this test the court essentially formed a justifiable rationale
for believing the witness, simply a standard by which a court could
grant or withhold credence to a particular witness. However, the
court cited State ex rel. Evanow v. Seraphim,3 stating:
• . . that the issue as to credence or credibility is for the trial.
The hearing as to probable cause before the magistrate is not a
preliminary trial. It is not the proper forum to debate and deter-
mine issues as to credibility and weight of evidence once essential
facts as to probability have been established.1
The question then is how does one determine whether the facts
establish probability without weighing the evidence and granting or
withholding credence to witnesses. The case of State ex rel. Hanna
v. Blessinger,34 attempts to answer this question citing State ex rel.
Tessler v. Kubiak,35 as follows:
The examining magistrate determines if this burden has been met
[whether there is competent evidence for the judicial mind to act
on in determining the existence of essential facts]. He has the
duty of determining the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given to their testimony.36
It appears, therefore, that the court in one instance would allow
the magistrate to so tune his ear that he could only hear enough
facts to make a lightweight probable cause determination but no
substantial findings; whereas the same court, ruling later, would
grant the magistrate the same powers granted by the California
court - to weigh the evidence and grant or withhold credence to
particular witnesses.
The most recent case treating this issue, Wilson v. State, at-
30. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
31. State v. Knudson, 51 Wis.2d 270, 274, 187 N.W.2d 321, 324 (1971).
32. 40 Wis. 2d 223, 228, 161 N.W.2d 369, 371 (1968).
33. State v. Knudson, 51 Wis. 2d 270, 274, 280, 187 N.W.2d 321, 327 (1971).
34. 52 Wis. 2d 448, 190 N.W.2d 199 (1971).
35. 257 Wis. 159, 162, 42 N.W.2d 496, 498 (1950).
36. State ex rel. Hanna v. Blessinger, 52 Wis. 2d 448,450, 190 N.W. 2d 199,200 (1971).
1974]
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tempts to rectify this conflicting position taken by the Wisconsin
court:
• . . the magistrate must determine credibility of witnesses if he
is to determine that there is credible evidence to support a finding
of probable cause. But the determination is merely one of plausa-
bility of the story and not general trustworthiness of the witness.
The central approach fo the role of the magistrate in deter-
mining credibility of witnesses is one of degree. . . . There is a
point where attacks on credibility become discovery. That point
is crossed when one delves into general trustworthiness of the
witness, as opposed to plausability of the story. 8
In applying this new formula, the court held that the defense coun-
sel should have been allowed to cross-examine the state's witness
relative to her prior description of the man who shot her husband
because the question asked did "not merely go to the witness's
general trustworthiness, but also to the plausability of her descrip-
tion, upon which the finding of probable cause rested." (Emphasis
added.)39
The court, in this its most recent attempt to clarify the scope
of the magistrate's role at the preliminary examination, has suc-
ceeded in clouding the issue further by this compromise definition.
Under this new formula, the magistrate must weigh the plausabil-
ity of the story but not the credibility of the person who tells it.
Furthermore, in applying the test it appears that if the evidence
merely goes to the general credibility of the witness, it may not be
considered; but if the evidence goes to the general credibility and
also the plausability of the story, then the magistrate may consider
it in his determination of probable cause. If magistrates are to
perform their function with any judicial certainty and consistency,
and if counsel for both prosecution and defense are to know how
to properly approach the preliminary examination, a realistic defi-
nition of the role of the magistrate is essential.
The recent case of Myers v. Commonwealth'" considered this
issue in a realistic fashion. Essentially the case holds that:
Since the examining magistrate's determination of the minimum
quantum of evidence required to find probable cause to bind over
is somewhat analogous in function to the court's ruling on a
37. 59 Wis. 2d 269, 208 N.W.2d 134 (1973).
38. Id. at 294-295, 208 N.W.2d at 148.
39. Id. at 295, 208 N.W.2d at 148.
40. - Mass. -, 298 N.E.2d 819 (1973).
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motion for a directed verdict at trial as to whether there is suffi-
cient evidence to warrant submission of the case to the jury, we
have decided to adopt a "directed verdict" rule in defining the
minimum quantum of credible evidence necessary to support a
bind-over determination. 1
An examination of the court's reasoning reveals several key ingre-
dients contributing to the court's ultimate decision to adopt the
"directed verdict" standard.
The first such ingredient was the court's consideration of a
proper construction of section 38, chapter 276 of the (1972) Massa-
chusetts General Laws which provided:
• . . [T]he witness for the prisoner, if any, shall be examined on
oath, and he may be assisted by counsel in such examination of
the witnesses in support of the prosecution. (Emphasis added.)"
Wisconsin Statute section 970.03(5) (1971) closely parallels this
statute. 3 The Massachusetts court reasoned that an examination
of the purposes and procedure of the preliminary hearing itself was
necessary to arrive at a construction which best reflected the pur-
pose for which the statute was enacted." In its performance of this
task the court applied the rule of Coleman v. Alabama," which
held that the preliminary hearing was a "critical stage" in the
state's criminal process at which the constitutional safeguard of a
right to counsel should obtain." The court concluded that since the
primary function of the preliminary hearing was to screen out at
this "critical stage" of the criminal process those cases which
should not go to trial, thereby sparing the accused of unjustified
detention and prosecution; 47 and since the primary function of the
magistrate at this "critical stage" was to determine whether there
was sufficient credible evidence to proceed to trial, the role of the
magistrate was closely analogous to that of a trial judge ruling on
a motion for directed verdict."
41. Id. at 824,__ Mass. at _
42. Id. at 822, - Mass. at .
43. (5) All witnesses shall be sworn and their testimony reported by a phonographic
reporter. The defendant may cross-examine witnesses against him, and may call witnesses
on his own behalf who then are subject to cross-examination.
44. Myers v. Commonwealth,__ Mass.., 298 N.E.2d 819, 822 (1973) (hereinafter
Myers).
45. 390 U.S. 1 (1970).
46. Id. at 9-10.
47. Myers, at 822, -. Mass. -- accord, Thies v. State, 178 Wis. 98, 103, 189 N.W.
539, 541 (1922).
48. Meyers at 822, - Mass. at .
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The second ingredient was the court's consideration of the dif-
fering quanta of evidence needed to justify a finding of "probable
cause" by a magistrate, (1) at the arrest stage and, (2) at the bind-
over stage of criminal procedure. The court concluded that since
probable cause to arrest was frequently based upon a variety of
circumstances, including hearsay informatibn which may or may
not be allowable at trial; and that since at the preliminary hearing
a finding of probable cause imposes significantly greater costs
upon the accused and the state - namely that of a full trial,
the standard of probable cause to bind over must require a
greater quantum of legally competent evidence than the probable
cause to arrest finding to insure that the preliminary hearing's
screening standard is defined in a was the [sic] effectuate its
purpose. 9
The standard to be applied according to this rationale was that
which a judge ruling upon a motion for directed verdict would
apply - whether there was sufficient credible evidence to warrant a
jury's finding the accused guilty."
The Massachusetts court also noted that according to a recent
study sponsored by the American Bar Association the "directed
verdict" standard of probable cause was the most widespread
screening standard used by states which had probable cause hear-
ings. "
Taking all these factors into consideration the court ruled that
in order to effectuate the purposes for which the statute was passed
and to prevent the preliminary hearing from becoming a hollow
ritual, the statute in question must be construed to require an
"adversary hearing where the defendant is given a meaningful op-
portunity to challenge the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses
and to raise any affirmative defenses he may have.'"52
Clearly, a judge utilizing this standard could take the next
49. Id. at 824, - Mass. at -.
50. Id.
51. Id. n. 7.
52. Id. at 825, - Mass. at -. The court further states at page 828:
Our analysis of the purposes (and procedure) of the probable cause hearing leads us
to conclude that the defendant must be given the opportunity to cross-examine his
accusers and present testimony in his own behalf in order to insure that the hearings
vital screening function will be effectuated. Therefore, we hold that c. 276, § 38,
grants defendants mandatory statutory rights to cross-examine prosecution witnesses
and present testimony in their own behalf before the examining magistrate deter-
mines whether there is sufficient legally admissible evidence of the defendant's guilt
to justify binding him over for trial.
[Vol. 58
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logical step, and in an appropriate case such as Uhlemann make a
factual determination and dismiss the case on the merits.
There appears to be no rational basis for the refusal of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court to adopt the "directed verdict" stan-
dard in defining the role of the magistrate in preliminary examina-
tions in Wisconsin. County court judges are eminently qualified to
assume such a role as it is part of their daily routine to rule on
motions for directed verdict. Furthermore, problems with hearsay
information should now be reduced to a minimum in light of the
previously discussed two-pronged Aguilar test adopted by the Wis-
consin Supreme Court in State v. Knudson,53 which already estab-
lished certain standards concerning the quantum of evidence
needed for the magistrate to find probable cause to bind over based
on hearsay information, and the liberal exceptions to the hearsay
rule recently adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Wis-
consin Rules of Evidence.5 4 Finally, the ever-present fear that
adoption of such standards would transform the preliminary hear-
ing into a mini-trial with disastrous results to an already overbur-
dened criminal justice system is unfounded. Trial strategy would
usually prevent such a result. "Normally defense counsel will be
more concerned at the preliminary with exploring rather than de-
stroying the prosecution's case. ' 55 But, when the defense believes
his evidence is compelling enough to overcome the prosecution's
case, why preclude him from demonstrating this fact and prevent-
ing the state from procuring a bind-over? In addition, the magis-
trate would possess the same discretion and control over the pro-
ceeding as he would at trial relative to limiting the evidence to the
relevant issues in dispute.
The Wisconsin court's policy in attempting to define the role
of the magistrate has lacked consistency and failed to provide a
realistic standard with which the bench and bar can identify. An
adoption of the "directed verdict" standard would provide a realis-
tic standard, one which is presently used by judges in conducting
53. See text accompanying footnote 31.
54. See §§ 908.01(4) concerning prior statements of a witness used as substantive evi-
dence; 908.03(l)-(3) regarding hearsay exceptions relating to present sense impressions,
excited utterances, and their existing mental, emotional, or physical conditions; 908.045(1)
relative to hearsay exception concerning former testimony of an unavailable witness; and
908.06 regarding former statements used for impeachment purposes. WISCONSIN RuLEs OF
EVIDENCE, 56 MARQ. L. REV. 332, 350, 394, 408 (1973); 59 Wis. 2d Rpp. 220, 250, 303,
325, and 328 (1973).
55. Myers at 828, - Mass. at -.
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their daily business, and one with which counsel can identify with
certainty.
Wisconsin courts have also refused to allow the principle of res
judicata to attach at the preliminary hearing stage. Because deter-
minations made at the preliminary examination never reach the
level of ultimate issues of guilt or innocence, res judicata has never
been applicable to the preliminary examination stage.56 This con-
clusion necessarily follows from the confusion of the role assigned
to the magistrate as previously discussed. It is evident that in order
to allow res judicata principles to obtain in certain circumstances,
the role of the magistrate must be broadened to provide for suffi-
cient findings reaching the ultimate issues of guilt or innocence in
specific situations as the Uhlemann case provided.
The applicable Wisconsin appeal statutes are sections 274.05
and 974.05. A defendant may obtain a review of the magistrate's
finding of probable cause by first swearing out a writ of habeas
corpus followed by a writ of error to review the findings of the
habeas corpus hearing. The state, on the other hand, has a more
limited right of appeal. If the ruling of the magistrate concerns a
motion to suppress evidence, quash an arrest warrant, or suppress
a confession or admission, section 974.05 will apply." However, if
the order of the magistrate merely concerns dismissal for lack of
probable cause, an appeal under this statute will not apply.58 From
a practical point of view, there is no present need for appeal be-
cause of the ease with which the state can refile the charges thereby
obtaining its review.
OTHER FUNCTIONS
A major cause of the present status of the preliminary examina-
tion as a useless routine is the entrenched opinion, formed from
56. Jones v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 642, 178 N.W.2d 42 (1970); State ex rel. Beck v. Duffy,
38 Wis. 2d 159, 156 N.W.2d 368 (1968).
57. WIs. STAT. § 974.05(1)(d) (1971).
58. Legislative Comment - 1969, Wis. ANNOTATIONS § 974.05 (1970):
With one exception, this is former s. 958.12. That exception which is a major
change is sub.(l)(d) which permits the state to appeal from an order suppressing
evidence, a confession or an arrest warrant. Since these matters normally determine
the successful outcome of prosecutions, it is believed the state should be able to take
an immediate appeal rather than wasting the time of the court with a hollow trial
where the result is preordained by the ruling on the suppression question. For defen-
dant's right in this area, see s. 971.31(10).
Section 958.12 was preceded by Wis. STAT. § 358.12 (1949), Wis. ANNOTATIONS §
958.12(1960). Under § 358.12, State v. Friedl, 259 Wis. 110, 47 N.W.2d 306 (1951) and
State ex rel. Arthur v. Proctor, 255 Wis. 355, 38 N.W.2d 505 (1949), held that appeal from
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experience, that the major function of the preliminary is to bind
the accused over for further proceedings. Too often the tenor of
the hearing is to overlook the accused's rights at this time, because
he will have his chance at trial. Too often the preliminary proceed-
ing is viewed as a duplicitous proceeding, the attitude being that
any benefits acquired here could just as easily have been obtained
by other means.
. . . The courts tend to limit their scope of analysis to the interest
of the prosecution, although giving lip service to the phrase that
the hearing is held 'primarily for the benefit of the accused.'59
In order to make an adequate appraisal of the overall importance
of the preliminary examination, consideration needs to be given to
a proper identification and analysis of the other functions fre-
quently overlooked in this procedure.
1. Discovery at Pre-Trial. Although refuted by State v.
Knudson,"0 as unnecessary fishing for elements in the state's case,
in practice defense counsel must use the preliminary examination
as the key to determine what to request under section 971.23.61
2. Freeze Testimony. The preliminary examination provides
a chance for direct and cross examination of witnesses to develop
the testimony. The transcript may be used at trial as an impeach-
ment tool, or if the witness is unavailable, as substantive evidence.62
Certainly the preliminary examination imposes much less of a
burden upon counsel to obtain testimony than Wisconsin Statute
section 967.04 providing for depositions only under certain circum-
stances." The accused can also make statements on his own behalf
preliminary hearing would not lie. See also Beals v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 599, 191 N.W.2d
221 (1971). Since sub.(l)(d) was the only change in the law it appears that no appeal will
lie in the event the magistrate dismisses for lack of probable cause.
59. Note, The Preliminary Hearing - An Interest Analysis, 51 IowA L. REv. 164, 177
(1965).
60. 51 Wis. 2d 270, 187 N.W.2d 231 (1971).
61. See Comment, The Preliminary Examination in the Federal System: A Proposal
for a Rule Change, 116 U. PENN. L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1968); Note, Preliminary Hearing
in the District of Columbia - An Emerging Discovery Device, 56 GEo. L. J. 191 (1967);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
62. §§ 908.045(1), 908.06 WISCONSiN RuLEs OF EVIDEN cE, 56 MARQ. L. REV. 394, 408
(1973); 59 Wis. 2d Rpp. 325, 328 (1973); see California v. Green, 339 U.S. 149 (1970)
regarding confrontation question.
63. See 967.04(1):
If it appears that a prospective witness may be unable to attend or prevented from
attending a criminal trial or hearing, that his testimony is material and that it is
necessary to take his deposition in order to prevent a failure of justice, the court at
any time after the filing of an indictment or information may upon motion and notice
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if he so chooses. 4
3. Basis for Plea Bargaining. If each counsel can get a feeling
of the case through a preliminary examination, there is a better
basis for plea bargaining, e.g., dismiss the action, amend to a
misdemeanor, or amend to a lesser included crime.
4. Motions. While objections to the sufficiency of the com-
plaint must be made prior to the preliminary hearing, 5 the prelimi-
nary examination may provide the basis for motions to suppress
evidence, motions under sections 971.23 - 971.25, or objections to
the admissability of a statement made by the defendant, which
motions may be made at a later time.66 Furthermore the defense
may, upon notice, wish to petition the judge at the preliminary
hearing for alteration in the amount or conditions of the accused's
bail. 7
5. General Benefit to the Accused. The preliminary examina-
tion could serve as a procedural check on the state's prosecutorial
power, preventing unwarranted restraints of an individual's liberty,
avoiding the increased anxiety of having to undergo a possible
criminal trial, easing the financial burden by ending the action at
an early stage, and minimizing the harm to a person's reputation,
and generally protecting to a degree against all the inherent hard-
ships imposed upon an accused in a criminal action regardless of
ultimate acquittal.
6. Benefits to the Prosecution. The preliminary provides an
opportunity to test the state's as well as defendant's witnesses to
see how they react to cross-examination. It may expose a weakness
in the state's case because of a prejudicial witness or one motivated
by an ulterior motive. It may also save needless expense and time
consumed in proceeding to trial.6 8
It is readily apparent that the benefits of the preliminary hear-
to the parties order that his testimony be taken by deposition and that any designated
books, papers, documents or tangible objects, not privileged, be produced at the same
time and place. If a witness is committed pursuant to s. 969.01(3), the court shall
direct that his deposition be taken upon notice to the parties. After the deposition
has been subscribed, the court shall discharge the witness.
64. See State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 265, 133 N.W.2d 753, 764
(1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1017 (1966) to the effect that by making statements in his
own behalf in circumstances such as these does not compromise the defendant's right to
refuse to take the stand upon the trial in chief.
65. WIs. STAT. § 971.31(5)(c) (1971).
66. WIs. STAT. § 971.31(5)(b) (1971).
67. Wis. STAT. § 969.08(1),(2) (1971).




ing and the potential role it could play in criminal procedure go
far beyond the mere testing of the sufficiency of the evidence.
CONCLUSION
The preliminary examination is a critical procedural safeguard
which can offer substantial benefits to both prosecution and de-
fense. It can be a vehicle for many important functional considera-
tions at a criminal prosecution. It is hoped that antiquated and
regressive aspects of the preliminary examination will be cast aside
in favor of progressive practical changes in the procedure and the
attitudes of those it affects. The recent action by the Wisconsin
legislature exhibits an attempt in this regard. The recent decisions
of People v. Uhlemann and Myers v. Commonwealth appear to be
steps in this direction by other jurisdictions. It is time for Wiscon-
sin to grant its preliminary examination a new vitality consistent
with modern justice. A system of law which guarantees "the right
of the people to be secure .. .against unreasonable .. .sei-
zures" 69 cannot tolerate less than a wholehearted effort in this
matter.
DAVID B. DEAN
69. U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
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